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As 1994 drew to a close, trade statistics revealed that the North American Free Trade
Agreement had dramatic and positive effects upon the Mexican economy. Mexico's trade
with the United States was up 17.5 percent and, with Canada up 33.3 percent in the first
seven months of 1994, according to Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, Legal Advisor to the
Section on Commercial Negotiations of the Ministry of Trade and Industrial Develop-
ment (SECOFI). 1 Speaking at the American Bar Association Section of International Law
and Practice Fall Meeting, Aguilar said Mexican exports to the United States in the first
seven months of 1994 were up 20.5 percent over the same period in 1993, while U.S. ship-
ments to Mexico increased by 10.8 percent. 2 U.S. Department of Commerce Secretary
Ronald H. Brown likewise reiterated that the North American Free Trade Agreement was
"working:' citing trade statistics for the first nine months of 1994 showing that U.S.
exports to Mexico were at $37.5 billion, up 21.7 percent over the same period in 1993,
while imports from Mexico were up 22.8 percent at $35.7 billion.3 In addition, foreign
investment in Mexico dramatically increased under the NAFTA, underscored by $8 bil-
lion in investments during January-June of 1994, a 31 percent rise over the same period
in 1993. 4
Aside from the successful trade developments occurring between Mexico and the
other NAFTA signatories, Mexico seemed poised to become an export platform to
Central and South America, most notably because the nation had recently concluded Free
Trade Treaties with Chile, Costa Rica and Bolivia, was negotiating such a treaty with
Ecuador, and was prepared to formally implement the G-3 Accord previously signed with
Columbia and Venezuela in June 1994.5 In sum, commentators from Mexico's legal com-
munity made it clear at the ABA meeting that Mexico's modern trade and investment
institutions, along with modem tax frameworks and other laws, made it an attractive and
appropriate platform to do business within Mexico, the NAFTA area and Latin America. 6
Thus, as a member of the NAFTA, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
and of the several intra-American Free Trade Agreements, Mexico had been expected to
be the guiding light for the rest of Latin America to break free from a "long tradition of
minimizing imports and protecting-at-any-cost local industry against more efficient for-
eign competition.' 7
1. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, p. 1797 (Nov. 23, 1994).
2. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 1, at 1797.
3. Id. at 1795.
4. Id. at 1797.
5. Id. at 1798.
6. Id.
7. Mexico: Special Report-Mexico-U.S. Helps Strengthen the Safety Net, Reuter Textline, Lloyd's
List, Feb. 7, 1995.
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II. The Mexican Financial Crisis
A. DECEMBER 1994
Immediately prior to the mid-December Summit of the Americas in Miami, where
the groundwork was prepared to create a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA),
Jaime Serra Puche, Mexico's then-existing Secretary of Finance, asserted that the Mexican
government had to maintain greater fiscal discipline and stricter federal budget control if
the nation was to meet its objectives of economic growth and price inflation set by the
new administration of President Ernesto Zedillo.8 Hence, in order to facilitate these goals
and to prevent a run on its currency in foreign-exchange markets, the Zedillo
Administration proceeded to devalue the peso, which had previously been fixed at 3.5 to
the dollar on December 20, 1994. 9 However, the value of the peso plummeted much fur-
ther than the devaluation; Mexico's equity markets fell dramatically, and foreign specula-
tive investors began making a near-panic exodus of its markets. By December-22, 1994,
Mexico abandoned its defense of the peso and allowed the currency to float, but the peso
continued weakening to 5.40 per dollar at the beginning of 1995.10
B. JANUARY 1995
Thus, on January 3, 1995, President Zedillo announced an economic emergency
plan, entitled The Agreement of Unity to Overcome the Economic Emergency, which was
signed between the Mexican government, the Bank of Mexico and the labor and business
sectors, in order to re-establish investors' confidence and prevent an inflationary spiral
caused by the devaluation of the peso." In this announcement, Zedillo also officially con-
8. 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, p. 1952 (Dec. 21, 1994). Serra asserted that the new govern-
ment would work to achieve several economic objectives, including: (i) 4 percent growth in the
nation's gross domestic product in 1995; (ii) price inflation, expected to reach 6.9 percent in
1994, of no more than 4 percent in 1995; (iii) non-petroleum export growth of 15.5 percent of
gross domestic product in 1995, up from an expected 14.1 percent in 1994; (iv) continued
import growth to 21.9 percent of gross domestic product, up from 20.8 percent in 1994; and (v)
a 7 percent rise in the dollar value of exports and 6.7 percent rise in imports in 1995. Id. at 1952-
53; see also Roberto Galvan Gonzales, Bank of Mexico Reorganization-Central Bank Spin-Off,
Business Mexico, June 1994 (analyzing the duties of the newly autonomous Bank of Mexico and
its strategies for implementing Mexico's stabilization program).
9. See Quick Fix Clinton Arranges Aid to Mexico Via Executive Order, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 199 , at A1,
A6. Economist Luis Pazos, Director of the privately-owned Centro International de la Empresa
Privada (International Center for the Study of the Private Sector), asserted that the Mexican
economy was in a "Catch-22" situation because of its over-dependence on foreign capital
inflows, as opposed to more direct investments. Pazos stated that the Mexican government relied
on the ratification of the NAFTA, which added safeguards to investors, to correct this imbalance,
but the January 1, 1994 peasant uprising in Chiapas delayed the expected shift in the economy.
See Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 8, at 1952.
10. Wall St. J., supra note 9, at A6; 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, p. 60 (Jan. 11, 1995).
11. 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, p. 14 (Jan. 4, 1995). Details of the Emergency Plan included: (i)
increasing the minimum wage by 10 percent; (ii) an agreement of major businesses to make an
extraordinary effort to maintain lower prices; (iii) government promises to restrict price
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firmed reports that the Mexican government negotiated an estimated $18 billion financial
package with international organizations and Mexico's biggest trading partners, the
United States and Canada. 12
However, both financial markets and analysts reacted with skepticism to Zedillo's
plan; on January 4, the peso further weakened in trading to 5.60 per dollar, and the
Mexican equity market index suffered a 140-point loss early that morning. 13 On January
9, 1995, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Mexico drew on the $18 billion emergency-
credit facility to intervene in currency markets in support of the peso and managed to lift
it by 5.8 percent; however, it soon became clear that these efforts would not have any last-
ing effects. 14 Hence, on January 12, the Clinton Administration proposed to Congress a
Mexican "Aid Package" that included $40 billion of loan guarantees to Mexico. 15 In the
Mexico Fact Sheet, the Clinton Administration asserted in relevant part as follows:
If we do not act now, Mexico faces a protracted economic crisis that
would have severe consequences for the United States. Such a crisis
Note 11, continued
increases on basic goods it supplies, and to cut spending by 1.3 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct, efforts to investigate and eliminate regulations that reduced competitiveness of Mexican
companies; and (iv) greater efforts in assisting small and medium businesses in various sectors
and in privatizing the nation's ports, railroads, airports, and communications networks. Id.
12. Id. In Washington, the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve announced that the
United States was contributing $9 billion to an $18 billion stabilization fund, as part of an inter-
national expansion of credit to Mexico. In a joint statement, they said that an existing $6 billion
"swap" line between the United States and Mexico was being supplemented with a $3 billion
short-term facility, with the Treasury and the Fed each contributing $1.5 billion. Canada, the
other member of the trilateral North American financial grofip, was to supplement its C$1.0 bil-
lion swap facility between the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Mexico with an additional
C$500 billion. The package also included a $3 billion line-of-credit in which a number of major
international banks were participating, and $5 billion from the Bank for International
Settlements, guaranteed by the central banks of some of the member countries. The Bank of
Mexico, of course, asserted that it would severely limit commercial credit in order to control
inflation, with exceptions made for the agricultural sector, small- and medium-size businesses,
and export-promoting activities. According to the Mexican Investment Board, the $18 billion,
together with the Bank of Mexico's international reserves of $6.15 billion, would be available to
stabilize the domestic financial market, but would not be used to finance the current account
deficit of more than $27 billion. The Board stated that the deficit would be funded chiefly by
direct foreign investment and "moderate" borrowing by the public and private sectors. Id.
13. Int'l Trade Rep., supra note 10, at 60.
14. For a broad discussion of the issues surrounding the financial crisis in Mexico, see, e.g., Mexico:
Financial Focus-Strong Medicine Needed to Cure Mexico's Economic Ills, Reuter Textline, Lloyds
List, Feb. 4, 1995; Michael Marray, Mexico: Euromoney Supplement on Mexico, Euromoney, Jan.
18, 1995; CNN, Inside Business, Transcript No. 244 (Jan. 8, 1995); Tim Golden, Mexicans Find
Dreams Devalued, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1995, at sec. 4, p. 5, col. 1.
15.12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, p. 157 (Jan. 18, 1995) (providing the Clinton Administration
Fact Sheet on Mexico).
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would hit the United States' economy hard. Mexico is our third-largest
export destination ... [Nlearly 700,000 U.S. jobs depend directly on sales
to Mexico ... California sells $5 billion worth of goods to Mexico yearly;
Michigan sells $6 billion, nearly 20 percent of its export sales; Arizona
and New Mexico also sell near 20 percent of their export sales to
Mexico; Texas sells Mexico $13 billion worth of products, more than
one-third of its export sales. These and other states which rely heavily on
trade with Mexico could see declines in income, as well as job losses.."
[A] Mexican crisis could spread to other emerging market
economies, which are the fastest-growing customers for U.S. products,
thereby hindering the U.S. economic recovery ... Investors in other
developing countries could withdraw the funds that are fueling growth
in these new markets. Because Mexico is a prototype for developing
markets, the risks in this case are unique ...
A protracted Mexican economic crisis is preventable because
Mexico is currently facing a financial loss of confidence-not funda-
mental problems in its economy.... Mexico's economy is fundamentally
strong. The Mexicans are pursuing disciplined economic and fiscal
policies. Their ratio of debt to national income is moderate, at about 40
percent. ... Mexico's main problem is a credit squeeze, or loss of liquidi-
ty, brought on because fearful investors have halted new lending to
Mexico ...
As investment tapered off, demand for Mexico's currency, the peso,
also declined. This undermined investor confidence further, and generated
concerns that Mexico could not afford to pay off some $40 billion worth of
short-term obligations-including dollar-indexed bonds, CD's and bank
credits-coming due over the next 6 months. As long as investors and
lenders stay out of Mexico, it will not be able to pay its bills. However, if
the United States backs loans to Mexico to stretch out maturities,
renewed confidence should be sufficient to bring investors back with-
out guarantees. To help Mexico through its liquidity crisis, the adminis-
tration is working with Congressional leadership on a loan guaranty of
up to $40 billion. 16
In this initial proposal, the Clinton Administration asserted that (i) the Mexican gov-
ernment would pay the United States up front and in cash for the right to use the loan
guaranty, and that it would provide backing in the form of proceeds from PEMEX's
petroleum sales, along with other conditions, to help ensure that the United States would
be repaid, and (ii) the support package would be a one-time event, and not a precedent. 17
However, by January 17 lawmakers from both parties and in both houses of Congress
asserted that they needed more detailed information about the Clinton Administration's
plan to offer the loan guarantees to Mexico-particularly the plan's collateralization
16. Int'l Trade Rep. supra note 15, at 157-59.
17. Id. at 157; see also id. at 107.
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scheme-before they could support it.18 While Congress considered the Clinton Adminis-
tration proposal, on January 26 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) tentatively
approved $7.8 billion in loans for Mexico that would allow the Mexican government to
borrow in support of the peso in foreign-exchange markets. 19 In addition, and in connec-
tion with an initiative to raise additional financing of approximately $10 billion from a
group of non-G-10 countries, the Executive Board of the IMF approved on a contingency
basis the augmentation of the overall resources available under the standby arrangement
by $10 billion.20
C. FEBRUARY 1995
1. U.S. & International Response
Unfortunately, by January 31 it became clear that Congress would not imminently
approve the loan guaranty package, and with Mexico's currency reserves dwindling to
$3.5 billion, the Mexican government would almost certainly be forced to default on its
short-term debt unless the U.S. reacted quickly. Hence, President Clinton, by Executive
Order on February 1, authorized Mexico to have access to a further $11 billion in the U.S.
exchange-stabilization fund, to in effect give Mexico access to a total of $20 billion from
these reserves. 2 1 The President announced that in addition to the United States' $20 bil-
lion exposure, the IMF would contribute a $17.8 billion medium and long-term lending
package for Mexico, for a total of $37.5 billion in lending.22
18. See Mexico, Int'l. Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA), Jan. 19, 1995. In fact, several lawmakers sought a
complete U.S. pullout from the NAFTA and appeared at a press conference to announce the
"NAFTA Withdrawal Act of 1995:' See 12 Int'l Trade Rep. No. 3, p. 106 (Jan. 18, 1995). None-
theless, House Republicans began circulating a draft of a Mexican Loan Guaranty Bill late
January 24 amid growing pessimism that a bill could be brought to the floor later that week, and
Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin andFederal Reserve Board Chairman Allen Greenspan
briefed lawmakers on the Clinton administration's package on January 25. See 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. No. 4, p. 200 (Jan. 25, 1995).
19. Wall St. J., supra note 9, at A6.
20. Press Conference with Michel Camdessus, Director, International Monetary Fund, IMF Program
of Assistance for Mexico, Fed. N. Serv., Feb. 2, 1995, available on LEXIS. In other words, to the
extent that contributions of governments and central banks fell short of the targeted $10 billion,
the IMF would make the balance available from its own resources. Thus, this additional amount
of $10 billion would assuredly be available to Mexico. Id.
21. Mexico-Clinton Opts to Use Executive Powers to Aid Mexico with $20 Billion Backing, Int'l Bus.&
Fin. Daily (BNA) Feb. 2, 1995.
22. Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily, supra note 21. Further, the Bank for International Settlements would
extend $10 billion in short-term lending to Mexico, while Latin-America and Canada pledged
$1 billion each. Id. The $20 billion U.S. contribution essentially provided three types of support
to Mexico: short-term swaps, coming from the Federal Reserve, making up $5-$6 billion of the
total, swaps with maturities of 3 to 5 years and securities guarantees with maturities of 5 to 10
years. Id. For President Clinton's analysis and defense of the Mexican loan guaranty package, see
CNN, News-International, Transcript Nos. 996-6, 996-9 (Feb. 1, 1995).
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2. Zedillo Administration Response
President Zedillo simultaneously announced that the Mexican government would
soon be moving to sell off ports and highways and open the railroads and satellite
telecommunications to private investors for the first time to raise foreign reserves while
also ensuring private investors that free-market reforms were still on track.23 Moreover,
Adrian Lajos Vargas, the Chief Executive of PEMEX, asserted on February 8 that PEMEX
would go ahead with the long-delayed sale of its petrochemical businesses in the next few
weeks to add to Mexico's foreign reserves. 24 Hence, the Mexican financial crisis appeared
to have been momentarily thwarted in the short-term through the joint efforts of interna-
tional organizations, foreign central banks, the Clinton Administration and the Mexican
government itself.
23. Zedillo Announces More Privatizations in Mexico , Agence France Presse, Feb. 3, 1995, available
on LEXIS. Article 25 of the Mexican Constitution establishes the Federal government's role in
the Mexican economy. It states that the Federal government shall plan, conduct, coordinate and
direct the economic activities of the country. It also determines that the Federal government will
have the property and control of certain strategic areas established in Article 28 of the
Constitution and that it may participate concurrently with the social and private sectors in order
to organize certain priority areas of economic growth. In addition to the Constitution, the
Foreign Investment Law of 1993 specifically sets forth the strategic areas exclusively reserved for
the State; these specifically (i) petroleum and other hydrocarbons; (ii) basic petrochemicals; (iii)
electricity; (iv) generation of nuclear energy...; (vi) satellite communications; ... (x) railroads; ...
(xiii) control, supervision and surveillance of seaports, airports and heliports. See Ley de
Inversion Extranjera, art. 5, D.O. Dec. 27, 1993 (hereinafter the "Foreign Investment Law").
However, although these areas are specifically reserved to the Mexican government for invest-
ment, Paragraph VI of Article 25 of the Mexican Constitution opens the door to privatization
because it establishes that the Federal government, in accordance with the needs of the country, will
promote the establishment and/or the enhancement of the activities performed by private and/or
social entities, subjecting them to the adequate modalities and organization, as well as the legal pro-
visions needed for the efficient use of the productive resources. Finally, Paragraph VIII states that
the Federal government will protect and promote the economic activities be developed by the
private sector, and will provide the conditions necessary so that this sector can contribute to the
national economic growth. Hence, at least one Mexican authority proffers that these Articles will
be liberally construed by the Zedillo Administration to allow for future privatizations in order to
help the Mexican government stabilize its financial crisis. See Javier M. Gallardo Guzman, Nafta
Implementation Update: Legal Considerations of the Economic Package Proposed to Face the
Economic Crisis (Jan. 1995), presented in "International Lawyering in the Americas," Dallas,
Texas, Jan. 26-27, 1995, at B-I - B-20.
24. Allen R. Myerson, Pemex Chief Sees Sale of Units Soon, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1995, at sec. D, p. 6,
col. 6. For a full discussion of the energy and petrochemical industries in Mexico and the
Mexican laws regulating the specific procedures for procurement, see Michael E. Arruda, Effect of
the North American Free Trade Agreement on Trade Between the United States and Mexico in the
Energy and Petrochemical Industries, 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 191 (Spring 1994); Mexican
Procurement Under NAFTA: Regulatory, Business and Legal Considerations, 4 Mex. Trade & L.
Rep. No. 9, Sept. 1, 1994.
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D. RISKS & CONSEQUENCES
However, regardless of any positive consequences generated by the U.S.-initiated guar-
anteed loan package, the Mexican economy will take a substantial amount of time to
recover from the effects of the peso devaluation. During that recovery period, a weak peso
and uncertain availability of U.S. dollars for repayments will in all likelihood limit the abil-
ity of U.S. companies, and certainly the enthusiasm of their lenders, to do business in
Mexico; however, Mexico's financial problems facilitate no economic reasons to expect that
its difficulties will turn into a "generalized financial crisis" for Latin America or for devel-
oping countries as a whole. Nonetheless, it is clear that Mexican companies are faced with
increasing competition from foreign entities, and their customers will undoubtedly begin
negotiating contract revisions to protect both the U.S. and Mexican parties from currency
risk and inflation. Hence, the Mexican financial crisis poses Chief Financial Officers of
companies from both countries with a series of tough choices: (i) whether contracts for
new projects should include renegotiation dauses, currency hedges and/or other methods
to ensure a set exchange rate, and other contract terms to protect the project's ongoing via-
bility during this period of uncertainty; (ii) whether to ride the fluctuations of floating-
rate funding on the domestic peso market; or (iii) whether to risk exchange losses on long-
term fixed-rate foreign currency debt.25
Moreover, the willingness of commercial banks and other lenders to provide financ-
ing, not just for projects in Mexico but for simple export sales to its customers, will likely
be significantly reduced in the near future.26 In any event, Mexico badly needs more effi-
cient peso capital markets to bring down the cost of capital and to help both Mexican and
foreign entities reduced volatility in their funding costs.27 Therefore, the business sector's
judgment of the Zedillo Administration, and hence the continuing success of the NAFTA,
will be strongly influenced by their success in developing them.
IlL Implementation and Preparatory Legislation for Integrating
the NAFTA Chapters into the Mexican Legal Framework
A. COMPETrION POUCY, MONOPOLIES AND STATE ENTERPRISES (NAFTA CHAPTER 15)
As is true with most developing economies, competition and antitrust policy has tra-
ditionally not been a major area of concern in Mexico. In fact, although Mexico has had
antitrust legislation for almost 60 years, antitrust enforcement is a relatively new concept
25. See Murray, supra note 14; John A. Detzner & George R. Gonzales, Doing Business in Post-
Devaluation Mexico, reprinted in 2 Inter-Am. Trade & Inv. Law No. 12, Feb. 3, 1995, at 244.
26. Detzner & Gonzales, supra note 25, at 244. Further, U.S. companies that have operated on an
open-account basis for their long-time Mexican customers may find themselves unable to con-
tinue offering such terms, either as a result of an internal risk assessment or at the direction of
their commercial banks. Id. at 244. The ability of Mexican companies to obtain local financing,
and even letters of credit, as well as U.S. dollars for repayment, likewise will be restricted. Id.
27. Marray, supra note 14.
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in Mexico because the Mexican government has never enforced the statute.28 Prior to the
enactment of the Federal Law on Economic Competition of 1993 (the Competition Law),
no antitrust enforcement agency or private antitrust actions existed. 29 Hence, the NAFTA
Chapter 1530 provides little in the way of concrete mechanisms for developing the kind of
coordinated or joint antitrust regime that is required for genuine integration of the
Mexican, Canadian and U.S. markets. Instead, the NAFTA signatories provided for gener-
al commitments to cognizable antitrust objectives: (i) to apply their domestic antitrust
rules to prevent anti-competitive business practices; (ii) to cooperate and coordinate in
enforcing those rules; and (iii) to use regulatory controls to ensure that State enterprises
or State-designated monopolies observed the commitments their government has made
in the NAFTA.3 1
1. Overview of NAFTA Chapter 15
The NAFTA Chapter-15 contains three central provisions. First, the signatories rec-
ognized that preventing anti-competitive activity would enhance the NAFTA objectives.
Hence, each signatory "recognizes the importance of cooperation and coordination
among their authorities to further effective competition law enforcement" in the North
American region.32 The signatories further agreed to cooperate in administering their
own antitrust legislation by exchanging information, providing mutual assistance among
enforcement agencies, and notifying the other signatories as to actions taken against for-
eign companies. 33 Notably, antitrust controversies and enforcement issues are specifically
exempted from the NAFTA dispute settlement provisions. 34
Second, each government has the ability to provide for a monopoly at its own discre-
tion; however, as with State enterprises, the NAFTA mandates that such monopolies can-
not discriminate against the local investments of other NAFTA signatories in exercising
licensing, fee-setting, approval powers, or in selling the monopolized good or service. 35
The NAFTA also imposes additional rules on monopolies that are not used to regulate
State-owned enterprises. These rules include the following: (i) the monopoly must act
"solely in accordance with commercial considerations" in selling or purchasing the
monopolized good or service, "including with regard to price, quality, availability, mar-
28. Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, Emergence of Mexico's Antitrust Enforcement Agencies, reprinted in I
Inter-Am. Trade & Inv. Law No. 48, Sept. 30, 1994, at 190.
29. Garcia-Rodriguez, supra note 28, at 190.
30. North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-
Can., ch. 15,32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
31.Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, North American Free Trade Agreement: Summary and
Analysis, at 73 (rev. ed. 1993).
32. NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1501.
33. Id. art. 1501.
34. Hence, where controversial antitrust-related actions are taken by one signatory government in a
way that aggravates the other, the complaining government can only request consultations; there
is no guaranty that the acting government will agree to consult over the action, and the offended
government cannot obtain independent NAFTA panel review. See Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
Walker, supra note 31, at 74.
35. NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1502; Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, supra note 31 at 75.
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ketability, transportation, and other terms and conditions of purchase or sale"; (ii) the
monopoly cannot discriminate against goods or services provided by another NAFTA-
signatory entity in buying or selling the monopolized good or service; and (iii) the
monopoly cannot use its advantages to engage in anti-competitive acts in non-monopoly
markets, "including through the discriminatory provision of the monopoly good or ser-
vice, cross-subsidization or predatory conduct" 36
Third, each government is free to establish State-owned enterprises at its discretion.
However, the establishing government must ensure (if it has delegated to the enterprise
powers to perform governmental functions) that the enterprise does not use those powers
to impair the rights of open investment established by Chapter 11 of the NAFTA-i.e.,
national treatment, non-discrimination, and an absence of performance requirements. 37
2. Mexico's Antitrust Law
In conjunction with the obligations posed by the NAFTA, the Mexican government
passed the Federal Law on Economic Competition, in December 1992.38 The foremost
purpose of the Competition Law is to provide for free economic competition through the
elimination of monopolies, monopolistic practices, restraints of trade and other anti-
competitive market practices.39 Hence, the Competition Law is broadly encompassing in
scope, and apparently applies to any economic entity, whether through an agent or firm,
regardless of its principal place or nature of business or nationality.40 Although, the
Competition Law does not apply to constitutional monopolies known as strategic activi-
ties, such as the petroleum industry, basic petrochemicals, satellite communications, and
railroads, 4' it should be noted that Mexican parastatals are deemed to be economic
agents, not constitutional monopolies, and therefore are subject to the Competition Law
provisions.42 Conversely, Mexican intellectual property companies, labor unions, cooper-
atives and labor associations selling their products abroad are exempted from the
Competition Law provisions. 43
a. Monopolistic Practices
The Competition Law clearly prohibits monopolistic practices, and distinguishes
between absolute monopolistic practices and relative monopolistic practices. Horizontal
anti-competitive agreements (i.e., absolute monopolistic practices) are defined in the
36. NAFTA, supra note 30, art. 1502.
37. Id art. 1503; Paul Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, supra note 31, at 74.
38. Ley Federal de Competencia Economica, D.O. Dec. 24, 1992, entered into force June 1993 [here-
inafter Competition Law]; see also Francisco Fuentes-Ostos, Antitrust Considerations in Mexico,
LatinFinance No. 48, June 1993, at M04.
39. Competition Law, supra note 38, art. 2.
40. Rogelio Lopez-Velarde, Mexico's New Antitrust Law, 1-2 (1993).
41. See Foreign Investment Law, supra note 23, art. 5. The strategic activities are specifically exempt-
ed from the Competition Law provisions. Competition Law, supra note 38, art. 4.
42. Lopez-Velarde, supra note 40, at 2; see also Report of the Task Force of the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association on the Competition Dimension of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Mar. 25, 1994, at 54 [hereinafter ABA Report].
43. Competition Law, supra note 38, arts. 5 & 6.
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Competition Law as agreements among competitors to join forces to fix prices, restrict
output and distribution of goods or services, divide markets or otherwise manipulate the
public bidding process. 44 If one of the above is proven in a Mexican court, it is deemed
illegal per se and can result in severe civil punishment under the Competition Law provi-
sions. 45 However, the Competition Law allows for most vertical-type agreements (i.e., rel-
ative monopolistic practices), except those made with the intent of effectively driving
competitors from the market or otherwise impeding their access to it.46 Such vertical
agreements may include: (i) geographical distribution restrictions; (ii) resale price main-
tenance; (iii) tying and other after-market agreements; (iv) reciprocal dealing, exclusive
dealing, or otherwise refusal to deal; (v) agreements not to compete; and (vi) any other
practices that illegitimately impede or affect competition. 47 Hence, to determine whether
such vertical agreements are unlawful under the Competition Law, Mexican courts must
effectuate an economic analysis similar to those employed by U.S. courts. 48
b. Mergers and Acquisitions
The Competition Law further introduced regulatory provisions on mergers and
acquisitions (concentraciones). A concentracion is defined under the Law as any merger,
acquisition, consolidation or any other act that combines corporations, associations,
shares, assets or trusts, between competitors, customers, suppliers or other business enti-
ties.49 The elements of proof necessary to characterize a concentracion as anti-competi-
tive (i.e., if the purpose or effect is to diminish, impair or hamper competition or free-
market participation in Mexico) focuses on the existence of substantial power over the
44. Id. art. 9.
45. Id. art. 35.
46. See Lopez-Velarde, supra note 40, at 5.
47. See Competition Law, supra note 38, art. 10.
48. ABA Report, supra note 42, at 61-62. Elements of proof include: (i) that the alleged company or
person had substantial power over the relevant market, and (ii) that the company or person
intended to harm the competition processes in Mexico. "Substantial power" is determined by
factors such as: (i) marketshare and whether the entity has the ability to engage in unilateral
price fixing or to otherwise restrict access to the market without actual or potential competitors
being able to refute that ability; (ii) the existence of barriers to market entry and possibilities of
altering those barriers; (iii) the existence of and relative market power of the competitors; (iv)
the parties' access to sources of input; (v) recent activity and conduct; and (vi) other criteria to
be established in the Competition Law Regulations. Competition Law, supra note 38, art. 13.
"Relevant market" is determined by: (i) the potential of substituting the good or service through
other suppliers, whether foreign or national, and considering technological aspects, consumer
input in the substitute good or service, and the time required to effectuate the substitution; (ii)
the cost of moving substitute goods across geographic areas and the time required for them to
enter a market; (iii) the costs of potential buyers to reach other markets; and (iv) tariffs or other
trade restrictions that limit consumer access to alternative sources of supply or limit the
provider's access to other customers. Id. art. 12.
49. Competition Law, supra note 38, art. 16; see also Robert L. Kimball, Mexico: Corporate Mergers
and Acquisitions, LatinFinance No. 63, Dec. 1994, at S26.
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relevant market, the degree of concentration in the relevant market, and other factors to
be included in the Competition Law regulations.50
c. The Federal Competition Commission
Most importantly, the Competition Law created the Federal Competition Commis-
sion (FCC), an independent administrative enforcement agency charged with conducting
investigations, issuing administrative rulings and generally enforcing the Competition
Law against entities engaged in anti-competitive market practices.5 1 The FCC has the
ability to impose civil penalties and enjoin anti-competitive market practices without
intervention of the Mexican courts, but FCC rulings may be challenged through judicial
review.52
In June 1994, the FCC released its long-awaited annual report for the 1993-94 term,
which set forth the investigations and cases resolved over the period.53 While the policy
statements and specific administrative rulings contained in the report are not legally
binding under Mexican law, they represent the guiding principles for the FCC's applica-
tion of the standard antitrust rules to date.54 Nonetheless, the FCC aggressively enforced
the Competition Law over 1993-94 in the area of monopolistic practices over the term by
initiating 16 investigations in various sectors of the Mexican economy. The most signifi-
cant investigations resulted in consent decrees in two long-restricted markets-the credit
card market and gasoline-station franchising. 55 The first investigation involved Mexico's
three largest banks-Bancomer, Banamex and Banco Serfin-in the open "coordination"
of their credit card operations. 56 The second investigation involved the market practices
of PEMEX-Refinancion, a subsidiary of PEMEX, in lieu of alleged tying arrangements
and exclusive dealings (considered "relative monopolistic practices") in connection with
the franchise of gasoline stations and the sale of oil lubricants. Aside from these consent
decree rulings, 6 of the 16 FCC investigations resulted in the agency imposing civil penal-
50. Id. art. 18. See also supra note 61. Further, the Competition Law includes notification procedures
for any mergers, consolidations or acquisitions (i) that exceed U.S. $55 million or more, (ii)
transactions involving the acquisition of 35 percent or more of the assets or shares of another
entity with assets or sales in excess of U.S. $55 million, or (iii) when the merging entities' joint
assets or annual sales exceed U.S. $220 million and the transaction involves the additional accu-
mulation of assets or shares of U.S. $22 million or more. Id. art. 20. See also Rogelio Lopez-
Velarde and Augustin Berdega-Prieto, Antitrust Enforcement in Mexico, Int'l Fin. L. Rev., Sept.
1994, at 34-35.
51. Id. art. 23. The FCC is comprised of five commissioners appointed by the Chief Executive for
10-year terms, subject to renewal, and is vested with broad powers to enforce the Competition
Law. Id. arts. 24-26.
52. See Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, Managing Free Competition in Mexico, The Recorder, Aug. 29,
1994, at 7.
53. See Garcia-Rodriguez, supra note 52, at 7.
54. Id. at 7. The only legally binding antitrust rules are those created in the Competition Law, imple-
menting regulations and judicial determinations. See Lopez-Velarde, supra note 50, at 34.
55. Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, The Year in Review: Mexico's New Antitrust Agency, reprinted in I Inter-
Am. Trade & Inv. Law No. 49, Oct. 7, 1994, at 194.
56. Garcia-Rodriguez, supra note 55, at 194.
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ties totaling $750,000.00; however, the FCC also dismissed many investigations on
grounds that they failed to state a cause of action under the Competition Law. 57
IV Other Post-NAFTA Regulations and Developments
A. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW AMENDMENTS AND REGULATIONS
1. 1994 Amendments to the Industrial Property Law
On August 2, 1994, the Mexican Congress passed a comprehensive package of
amendments to the Law of Development and Protection of Industrial Property,58 the
majority of which took effect October 1, 1994. Besides redesignating these statutes as the
"Industrial Property Law,"59 the 1994 amendments effectively (i) transferred administra-
tive oversight of industrial property rights in Mexico from the Secretaria de Comercio y
Fomento Industrial (SECOFI) to the newly created Instituto Mexicana de la Propriedad
Industrial (the Institute), (ii) amended the Industrial Property Law to comply with cer-
tain requirements of the NAFTA, and (iii) made technical improvements to the original
form of the Industrial Property Law.60 Most importantly, the 1994 Amendments provid-
ed the Institute with enforcement procedures similar to injunctive powers. 6 1 The
57. Id. at 194; see also Lopez-Velarde, supra note 50, at 35. In lieu of the FCC's vigorous enforcement
efforts, some discussion has ensued among officials in the Federal Trade Commission promot-
ing the examination of the North American Antitrust Statutes of each signatory country to see if
they may be harmonized in the future so as to provide a uniform set of antitrust rules under the
NAFTA. See 12 Int'l Trade Rep. No. 5, p. 223 (Feb. 1, 1995).
58.Ley de Fomento y Proteccion de ia Propriedad Industrial, D.O. June 27, 1991 [hereinafter
Industrial Property Law]. For a comprehensive discussion of the Industrial Property Law, see
John B. McKnight & Carlos Muggenburg, Mexico's New Intellectual Property Regime: Improve-
ments in the Protection of Industrial Property, Copyright License and Franchise Rights in Mexico,
27 Int'l Law 27 (Spring 1993); Rodolpho Sandoval & Chung-Pok Leung, A Comparative Analysis
of Intellectual Property Law in the United States and Mexico, and The Free Trade Agreement. 17
Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 145 (Fall 1993). Moreover, for a comprehensive discussion of the NAFTA
rules pertaining to intellectual property, see Foster & Alexander, Opportunities for Mexico,
Canada and the United States: A Summary of Intellectual Property Rights Under the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, 20 Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L. J. 67 (1994); Levy & Weiser, The NAFTA:
A Watershed for Protection of Intellectual Property, 27 Int'l Law 671 (Fall 1993); Paul, Hastings,
Janofsky & Walker, supra note 31, at 83-99.
59. Decreto por el que se Reforman, Adicionan y Derogan Diversas Disposiciones de le Ley de
Fomento y Proteccion de la Propriedad Industrial, D.O. Aug. 2, 1994 [hereinafter 1994 Amend-
ments].
60.John B. McKnight, Outlook for Franchising in Mexico-Current Problems and Long-Term
Solutions, (Jan. 1995), presented in "Lawyering in the Americas" Dallas, Texas, Jan. 26-27, 1995,
at D-8.
61.Prior to these Amendments, the administrative agency did not have injunctive powers. Rather,
enforcement was limited to the temporary or permanent closure of the business, or administra-
tive arrest. See Gerardo Olea & Gary Doyle, Mexico Advances Important Intellectual Property
134 NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas
Institute's new powers to provide injunctive relief include (i) the power to order the
accused infringer to suspend its circulation of goods; (ii) the prohibition of the commer-
cialization and use of the products and the impounding or confiscation of goods; and
(iii) the authority to temporarily or permanently close the infringer's business.62
The 1994 Amendments also give the Mexican judicial authorities the ability to utilize
these enforcement procedures. Article 228 of the revised Industrial Property Law states
that the judicial authorities may adopt the enforcement measures in the Law and those
found in international treaties to which Mexico is a signatory.63 Another important addi-
tion to the Industrial Property Law is the clarification of the requirements for the protec-
tion of patents under the Law. Under revised Article 229, in order to claim the protection
of the Law, it is necessary that the patentholder label the products' packaging with a
notice that the product is protected under the Industrial Property Law or other legal pro-
tections. 64 Other changes in the Industrial Property Law to patents made by the 1994
Amendments included (i) a clarification of the procedures to patent biotechnology and
(ii) the burden of proof requirements for "process" patent infringement. 65 Future changes
to the Industrial Property Law are being considered, and the Institute has begun-to pub-
lish a monthly review (the Gaceta) detailing industrial property developments.
Nevertheless, these new modifications should have the intended effect of boosting invest-
ment in products and services.66
2. 1994 Regulations to the Industrial Property Law-Focus on Franchising Requirements
As the Salinas Administration came to an end, regulations to the Industrial Property
Law and for the recently established Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (the
Institute) were published on November 23, 1994, and became effective on December 8,
1994.67 These regulations essentially measured, defined and secured the protections
afforded to intellectual properties such as patents, trademarks and industrial design/trade
secrets. 68 The 1994 Regulations specifically (i) addressed new patent application proce-
Note 61, continued
Protection, 1 Inter-Am. Trade & Inv. Law No. 41, Aug. 12, 1994, at 162. The injunctive relief pro-
visions entitle a party to seek relief through the Institute in relation to (i) the actual or immi-
nent infringement of an industrial property right; (ii) the possibility of suffering irreparable
harm as a result of an alleged infringement; or (iii) the justified reason to preserve relevant evi-
dence in regard to an alleged infringement. 1994 Amendments, supra note 59, art. 199(bis) et
seq., as discussed in McKnight, supra note 60, at D-8.
62. 1994 Amendments, supra note 59, arts. 199(bis), 212 (bis), as discussed in Olea & Doyle, supra
note 61, at 162.
63.1994 Amendments, supra note 59, art. 228, as discussed in Olea & Doyle, supra note 61, at 162.
64. 1994 Amendments, supra note 59, art. 229, as discussed in Olea & Doyle, supra note 61, at 162.
65. Id. Individuals presumed to be infringing on existing industrial property rights now have the
burden of proof that their good or process is not an infringement. Previously, the existing hold-
er was required to prove infringement. See 1 Inter-Am. Trade & Inv. Law No. 41, Aug. 12, 1994,
at 161.
66. Olea & Doyle, supra note 61, at 162.
67. Reglamento de le Ley Propriedad Industrial, D.O. Nov. 23, 1994 [hereinafter 1994 Regulations];
2 Inter-Am. Trade & Inv. Law No. 4, Dec. 2, 1994, at 221.
68. Id. at 221.
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dures and other specific methods for defining industrial property rights; (ii) defined pro-
cedures to seize or halt distribution of products violating these property rights; (iii)
defined licensing procedures for third parties seeking use of inactive patents; and (iv)
defined the powers and responsibilities of the Institute, its directors and subdirectors. 69
In addition, the 1994 Regulations addressed two specific areas of interest to fran-
chisors: pre-sale franchise disclosure and franchise agreement recordation require-
ments.70 First, Article 65 of the 1994 Regulations requires that the following information
be provided to potential franchisees: (i) the franchisor's name, corporate name, address
and nationality; (ii) a description of the franchise; (iii) the number of years the franchisor
has operated the subject franchise business; (iv) the intellectual property rights (i.e., both
industrial property rights and copyrights) comprising the franchise; (v) the types and
amounts of payments to be made by the franchisee to the franchisor; (vi) a description of
the technical assistance and services to be provided by the franchisor to the franchisee;
(vii) a definition of the geographical territory within which the franchise will be operat-
ed; (viii) information indicating whether the franchisee is entitled to subfranchises of
third parties and, if so, the requirements and terms for doing so; (ix) the franchisees'
obligations with respect to confidential information provided by the franchisor; and (x)
the franchisees' rights and obligations under the franchise agreement. 71 If a party fails to
provide the appropriate pre-sale franchise disclosure, a franchisee could be entitled to
seek rescission of the agreement and the return of any funds paid to the franchisor under
Mexican and State civil codes, be able to seek damages in lost profits resulting from the
failure to provide a public disclosure, and under Article 214 of the Industrial Property
Law, file a complaint with the Institute seeking imposition of civil fines. 72
Second, the 1994 Regulations clarified the requirements for recording licensing and
franchise agreements. Article 10 of the 1994 Regulations requires that an application for
recordation of a franchise agreement must be submitted to the Institute and delineate the
following information: (i) the names of the franchisor and franchisee and their respective
corporate names, addresses, nationalities and domiciles; (ii) the term of the franchise
agreement; (iii) whether the franchise agreement exclusively reserves to the franchisor the
right to initiate legal action to protect its industrial property rights under the franchise
agreement; (iv) the products or services identified by the trademarks or servicemarks
licensed under the franchise agreement; and (v) any other information required by offi-
cial standard forms. 7 3 Further, Article 10 allows parties to delete from the filed franchise
agreement the terms pertaining to the amounts to be paid by the franchisee to the fran-
69.Id.
70. See McKnight, supra note 60, at D-9. The Mexican market for franchises started to develop upon
deregulation of foreign investment and liberalization of the Transfer of Technology Law in 1990
and the publishing of the 1991 Industrial Property Law. See Reglemento de la Ley Sobre el
Control y Registro de la Transferencia de Tecnologia y el Uso y Explotacion de Patentes y
Marcas, D.O. Jan. 9, 1990.
71. 1994 Regulations, supra note 67, art. 65, as discussed in McKnight, supra note 60, at D-10. These
disclosure obligations apply to a franchisor granting master franchise rights to a subfranchisor
and also apply to a subfranchisor granting subfranchise rights to a subfranchisees. Id.
72. Id. at D-11.
73.1994 Regulations, supra note 67, art. 10, as discussed in McKnight, supra note 6,0 at D-1 1.
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chisor, including royalty rates, and also permit deletion of any descriptions of confiden-
tial information, including those which pertain to the forms and methods of distribution
in the commercial use of goods and services.74
B. NEW RULES FOR BusNEss VisAs (FMN)
On November 30, 1994, Release RE 1. 1 was published in the Federal Official Gazette
(FOG) to amend Release RE.-1 regarding the rules applied to the temporary entry of
"business visitors" according to the NAFTA. This last release, published on May 9, 1994 in
the FOG, created the immigration form (FMN) for "business visitors" under NAFTA.
This new Release has as its specific purpose to facilitate the distribution of FMN's not
only through the Mexican Consulates in Canada and the U.S., but also through travel
agencies, airlines and immigration agents at the ports of entry to Mexico. Likewise, com-
panies which perform international business may request to the Immigration National
Institute (INI) an authorization to possess FMN immigration forms that must be used
under their strict responsibility and in compliance with the rules issued by the INI.
Furthermore, this Release expressly establishes that foreigners that enter into Mexico
under a "business visitor" status (FMN) are neither authorized to perform paid-for activi-
ties nor to maintain a labor relationship without obtaining a prior approval of the INI
pursuant to the Population General Law.
On the other hand, "business visitors" who wish to extend their period of stay in
Mexico, must appear before the INI to apply for an exchange of their FMN for an FM3,
delivering the former for its cancellation. In addition, foreigners must declare that their
activity has not changed, and that no labor relationship has been maintained or created.
Likewise, foreigners must prove sufficient earnings to cover their living expenses while in
Mexico.
Finally the Release establishes that if a foreigner cannot leave the country before the
expiration of his FMN, the INI may issue a letter of definitive departure for up to 30 days
to conclude his period of stay in Mexico.7 5
-Chris Olive
74. Id. art. 10, as discussed in McKnight, supra note 60, at D- 12. Moreover, the 1994 Amendments
eliminated provisions providing that the recordation of a license or franchise agreement could
be rejected for "public policy" reasons or in the event the agreement in question excluded the
applicability of the Industrial Property Law. See 1994 Amendments, supra note 59, art. 150, as
discussed in McKnight, supra note 60, at D-9. The Mexican government has found franchising to
be a good and safe way to promote modernization and technology acquisition for most services
and manufacturing processes. Quality standards and service excellence promoted by the fran-
chising system are now recognized as useful in making Mexican industry more competitive. See
Non-Fast Food Franchising, 4 Mex. Trade & L. Rep. No. 4, Apr. 1, 1994. As a result, the Mexican
market for franchises grew 404 percent from U.S. $38.8 million in 1991 to U.S. $156.8 million in
1993, just for franchises registered by the Mexican Franchise Association. Id. Sales of franchise
establishments also grew 400 percent in the same period. Id.
75. Juan Francisco Torres Landa R., Esq. of Barrera, Siqueiros y Torres Lands, S.C., Mexico, D.F.
